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Abstract
There are no solid arguments to sustain that digital currencies are the future of online payments or
the disruptive technology that some of its former participants declared when used to face critiques.
This paper aims to solve the cryptocurrency price determination puzzle from a behavioral finance
perspective and trying to find the parallelism between the literature on biases present in financial
markets that serve as a starting point to understand crypto-markets. Moreover, it is suggested
that cryptocurrencies’ prices are driven by herding, hence this study test behavioral convergence
under the assuption that prices “as-is” are the coordination mechanism. For this task, it has been
proposed an empirical herding model based on Chang, Cheng, and Khorana (2000) methodlogy,
and expandind the model both under asymmetric and symmetric conditions and the existence of
different herding regimes by employing the Markov-Switching approach.
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1 Introduction
The digital economy have been increasing the exposure of state-of-art ideas, opportunities and
changes in economics paradigms. By the same token, cryptocurrencies as well as Blockchain’s
technology, and other potential applications are without a doubt a relevant concept that have
emerged on the “new economy”. One could assure that most of the interest on cryptocurrencies
was fueled by Bitcoin, the first successful implementation of a peer to peer network that could
serve as a payment method. The responsiveness from the public that Bitcoin had exposed has been
driven in part for the extreme upswings and downwings in prices, which has been also illustrated
in some degree by other alternative coins such as Ethereum, Ripple, Tokens or Initial Coin Offering
(ICO’s). As portrayed by Poyser (2018), it is difficult to align a future in which cryptocurrencies
make a significant economic change under current extreme price movements exhibited without the
existence of salient announcements.
The understanding of crashes in stock markets has been a difficult for economists for several years.
Theoretical foundations in financial economics rely ultimately on the assumption of efficiency
of markets. Nonetheless, several studies have found empirical evidence that contrariwise the
cornerstone of efficient markets. The behavioral economics uncover systematic deviations from
rationality exposed by investors, instead individuals are victim of their cognitive biases leading
to the existence of financial market inefficiencies, fragility, and anomalies. Particularly, crypto-
currency markets resembles in great fashion to the criticisms on financial markets exposed by
behavioral finance advocates.
Studies of behavioral finance aim to explain why investors in stock market settings act as they
do. In this work, it is hypothesized that it is possible to explain cryptocurrencies market prices’
puzzle from a behavioral finance perspective in which investors’ cognitive biases play a major role
to explain the volatility. In this context, this paper makes a literature revision on empirical and
theoretical evidence in which investors’ actions have been proved are not aligned with a rational
benchmark, that can also serve as a parallelism to the crypto-market problem. Furthermore, this
paper seeks as well to shed light on the price setting puzzle by attributing movements to investors
herding behavior, that is, a collective decision-making process in which prices “as is” are the
coordination mechanism to investing decision making. According to the literature, herding can
trigger the formation of speculative bubbles, thus, the main objective of this chapter is to study
cryptocurrency market under the hypothesis that crypto-investors have limited resources to process
information and weak prior knowledge, as a consequence they rely on others sources to valuate
cryptocurrencies, which can unchain unexpected results.
The paper is structured as follows: first, it has been contextualized the problem by comparing
cryptocurrency market behavior with past speculative bubbles. Second, it is defined some of
the most relevant theory on financial economics and the transition to behavioral economics to
find the parallilism between crypto-markets and the evolution of the literature. Third, it has been
provided some of the most common biases evidenced in financial settings and their relation with the
cryptocurrency’s case. In the fourth and fifth sections it is explained the data and the methodology
used for this work. Section six show the empirical results on herding behavior and concludes in
section 7 the main outcomes to the research.
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2 From Tulips to Blockchain
Due to the incentive to generate profits from price differentials, speculation is ubiquitous to a
market economy. Long time ago Fisher (1896) mentioned: “Every chance for gain is eagerly watched.
An active and intelligent speculation is constantly going on, which, so far as it does not consist of fictitious
and gambling transactions, performs a well-known and provident function for society.” Hence, a valid
conjecture is that as long as market economy has been developing, speculation has been growing
as well as a natural mechanism to those individuals who are willing to use strategical information
to their own good.
However, certain conditions such as high degree of speculation by misvaluations or delinked
relationships between risk and loss, are associated to market inneficiencies. There are several
cases of price booms in financial and non-financial environments have occurred without any
rational explanation, as a result, economic and financial jargon have created names like, “crashes”,
“bubbles”, anomalies, “financial crisis” or “tulip-mania”. The latter name refers to the first documented
“speculative bubble” when in the XVII century Tulips’ prices increased abruptly. For instance, an rising
in trade of goods inside Netherlands, increasing value in the national currency, a perception of
facing the transition to a new economy, novel colonial possibilities, and an increasingly prosperous
country, which led to create an atmosphere in which the now called “Tulip mania” (Mackay 1852;
Sornette 2003).
According to Mackay (1852), tulips’ bulbs were initially imported at retail from Turkey in the
middles of the sixteenth century. During the first stages of the market build-up, bulbs sales barely
covered production costs (Sornette 2003), albeit, by the end of 1500’s professional cultivators and
wealthy marketers started to offer exotic varieties of bulbs which rapidly gather the attention of
rich people, willing to pay extraordinarily high amounts of money for the bulbs. Sudenly, tulips
became a symbol of wealth and as the rumors dispersed in the society, other socioeconomic groups
such as middle-class people also realized of the possibility to easily obtain profits from buying
low and selling high in the market. As Sornette (2003) mentions, the now named “tulip-mania”
was perceived as a “sure thing”, suddenly, an atmosphere of euphoria where any hesitation was
dismissed, a complete confidence on the rumors of even higher prices led people to sell houses,
properties in order to invest in this activity. Prices of rare tulip bulbs escalated at a point where
there was no rational concordance with the price of other goods and services (Sornette 2003).
The process of continuous increases in prices attracted speculators who started to play with the
information in order to generate market fluctuations with the objective generate profits from
arbitrage activities. Interestingly, “many individuals grew suddenly rich. A golden bait hung temptingly
out before the people, and, one after the other, they rushed to the tulip marts, like flies around a honey-pot”
(Mackay 1852). As Sornette (2003) mentioned, “the conditions now generally associated with the first
period of a boom were all present: an increasing currency, a new economy with novel colonial possibilities,
and an increasingly prosperous country together had created the optimistic atmosphere in which booms
are said to grow”. Nonetheless, the “unexpectable predictable” ocurred, in February 1637 prices
collapsed at a 10% of the peak values shown months before, and never rose again. The tulip mania
has been since that time portrayed as the characterization of irrationality in markets.
Even though the tulip-mania was one of the former cases in which markets results deviates greatly
from expected, it has not been as striking and extended as financial crashes. This is exemplified by
the major historical stock market crash occurred in October of 1929 known as “Great Crash” that
also set the precedent for the Great Depression. Other examples are the “Black Monday” denoting
stock market boom ensued on October 19, 1987, or the “Dot-com” bubble occurred in the period
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1997-2001. As Garber (1990) portrayed, these events have “emerged from specific speculative episodes
have been sufficiently frequent and important that they underpin a strong current belief among economists
that key capital markets sometimes generate irrational and inefficient pricing and allocational outcomes”.
Given that the scope and impact such market collapses is significant, they remain at the central
debate between financial economics theorists, who try to explain the reason to such exceptional
deviations from the “fundamental values” and those who believe in markets driven by psychological
factors.
Historically, several products or services that ended in a crash were in the beginning exposed
as “disruptive”, “new”, “innovative”. Cryptocurrencies have not been different, in Poyser (2018) I
have briefly described how people describe them as the precursor of the new form of performing
empowered by the people. Certainly, news media have been playing a relevant role into forming
expectations and increasing the hype, this by broadcasting insiders and speculators’ ideas about
new projects, technological implementations, security advances and future applications. As a result,
there is a lot of noise that oftenly displace the discussion from serious and tangible projects to
marketing littered implementations.
To some extent it is expected such outcome taken in count that Blockchain is difficult to understand
even for information technology enthusiasts. As expressed before, any disclosure evoking a “new
economy” will always be an allure for people ready to obtain profits, notably in cryptocurrency
markets it is accompanied by a perception of foolproof investment, a sense of low probability
of losing money. As expected, extreme events such as 2013 Bitcoin’s price boom not only led
the genesis of mass hysteria, it also incentivated speculators to play with the information. Same
happened by the end of 2017, when Bitcoin’s price had a run up that caught public attention,
increasing the consensus among economists that it is hard to conciliate high volatility with a the
store of value function that any currency should exhibit (Also discussed in (Poyser 2018)).
In a nutshell, price increases attract large groups of investors, who believe that they can “jump into
bandwagon” in order to generate profits easily, even without figuring out how cryptocurrencies
really works and their potential, though aware that the opportunity cost of missing out is relative
high. By the same token, such enthusiasm has been promoted by news media, thus, price bid ups,
create further price rises, that is, a self-fulfilling prophecy. Under this situation, it is likely that
cryptocurrencies exhibit characteristics of a speculative bubble as many others have mentioned,
however, it is almost impossible to predict when it is going to occur.
3 Theory
3.1 An intent to find the parallelism within economic theory
It is been said that theory on financial economics formally started in the 1900 with Bachelier (1900),
who was interested in the application of random motion to explain the movements of prices of
a popular investment tool named “perpetuity bond”. In order to explain price dynamics, he
implemented the random walk, that is, a path created by the succession of random uncorrelated
steps in which each move is buffeted by a given equal probability. The first insight present in
Bachelier (1900) in that prices movements will tend to be on the average (zero) given an equal
probability of going “up” or “down”, therefore the trajectories are neutralized or canceled. Ad-
ditionally, the level in which prices fluctuate is named “fundamental value”, and any deviation or
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fluctuation created by the forces of the market (active participation from multiple investors) around
this value is governed by the so-called Gaussian distribution. Hence, any possibility of predicting
future values is impossible and therefore there is no deterministic chance to arbitrage both for
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. This result is possible due to the constant feedback
dynamics products of the constant participation, that is, any strategic information in hands of
an investor is quickly recognized and eliminated by others in the market who analyze prices1.
Up to now, I have described the origin and some of the cornerstone characteristics of the EMH
which had been intensively improved by other significant contribution of Eugene Fama, Stephen
Ross, Robert Merton, Myron Scholes, William Sharpe, among other whom works set the basis
to the contemporaneous modern finance theory. Another implication (probably simplification as
well) is that any asset has a fundamental and speculative components. According to the EMH the
latter follow a known probabilistic distribution, and constantly fluctuates around the fundamental.
Nonetheless, this argument has the most controversial given that hardly explain extreme volatility
events such as speculative bubbles and market crashes.
Several conclusions stems from the statements exposed above, first, financial prices embed inside
the sum of all information publicly provided over time, hence assets price are always correct, and
any deviation in is only product of market interchange2. Second, it is not possible to forecast any
futher price change, therefore, one could not systematically beat the market (Read 2012).
Evidently, a reasonable question to bear about is if such theory is indeed a good starting point to
describe crypto-markets. In this work, it has been highly focused on other facts that might reduce
crypto-market ambiguity, hence, we will center the attention to (exacerbated) speculation and its
consequences. Speculation has been a concern that takes back upon the times of John Maynard
Keynes, who proposed a tax on financial transactions that were excessively speculative. With the
purpose of limits the markets to legitimated investors and thus mitigate the impact on the economy
in case a potential burst (Keynes 1936; Read 2012). Speculative bubbles have been increasing
in attention since modern finance cannot explain how events such as crashes in Black Monday,
Dot-Com and the financial crisis in 2008. On this position, Robert Shiller has assuring that financial
market are driven exclusively by behavioral issues among the participants (speculative component
outbound the fundamental effect).
Summarizing, in this study it has been asked if cryptocurrencies can be analyzed from the efficient
markets markup. A first step is to dispel and characterize commonalities across the different
cryptocurrency, that is, asking if any given cryptocurrency met all the three functions of money. It
is likely several of them meet the unit of account and medium of exchange functions, nonetheless it
is hard to conciliate the store of value function given that all of them exhibit great volatility. The
second step is to question if any given CC has a fundamental value. Devotes might considered
Blockchain as itself has a value, but how can it objectively measured? And if it has fundamental
value, why are they so volatile without any reasonable explanation? For many people CC are
investments, independently if they classified as token, ICO, currency. . . Therefore, in absence of
1Fama (1965) describes accurately what an efficient market means by saying: “An efficient market is defined as a market
where there are large numbers of rational, profit-maximizers actively competing, with each trying to predict future market values of
individual securities, and where important current information is almost freely available to all participants. In an efficient market,
competition among the many intelligent participants leads to a situation where, at any point in time, actual prices of individual
securities already reflect the effects of information based both on events that have already occurred and on events which, as of now,
the market expects to take place in the future. In other words, in an efficient market at any point in time, the actual price of a security
will be a good estimate of its intrinsic value”
2In Shiller (2015), the author seriously critisized such assumption by saying: “price may appear to be too high or too low
at times, but, according to the efficient markets theory, this appearance must be an illusion.”
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fundamental or intrinsic value the speculative component is undoubtly driving prices. In the next
section, I will provide the characteristics that crypto-market has and how they comply with much
of the past arguments in favor of the “animal spirits”.
4 Beliefs formation and biases present in cryptocurrencies markets
During the Committee on Banking and Financial services in 1998, Alan Greenspan exposed his
views regarding the conjuncture of financial markets. He mentioned that human behavior is the
main factor that drives markets, and in spite of corrections there is a constant evolution that makes
behavioral issues pervasively which yields with violent and unexpected results. Even though this
is anecdotic, it has a great coming from someone who served as Chairman of the Federal Reserve
of the United States for almost 30 years. As it had been discussed before, the EMH had been the
central ideological domain of study among the classical financial theorists and empiricists until the
late seventies, however, in this case, it has several drawbacks to explain large deviations in prices
such as cryptocurrency phenomena.
A basic tenet of classical economic theory is that investment decisions reflect agents’ rationally
expectations, that is, decisions are made using all available information in an efficient manner.
A contrasting view is that investment are also driven by herd behavior, which weakens the link
between information and market outcomes (Devenow and Welch 1996; Scharfstein and Stein 1990).
In one sense, the EMH was so successful because it seemed to dispel the previously dominant
notion of an irrational market driven by herds3. The perceptions of Mackay (1852) and Kindleberger,
Aliber, and Wiley (2005) is that there was convincing evidence of “bubbles” of mass errors caused
by the fickle nature of herds.
Therefore, what has been happening with cryptocurrencies is closely related to the criticisms on
the rationality of investors. For such reason, behavioral finance tries to unveil market outcomes
under the existence of a large group of irrational investors by studying real-world investors’ beliefs
and valuations. Regarding information sources, it is particularly interesting that cryptocurrencies
advising is mostly available online, naturally, new (and old) investors are dependent on information
on fairly diversified sources, that is, individuals interested in cryptocurrencies usually form beliefs
and decisions based on two main sources: news and social media. Nowadays, many trends start
in specific forums, in these spaces users share impressions about last news and recent issues
like unexpected upswings or downswings in cryptocurrencies price or innovations in Blockchain
platform. That is case of Reddit, a social news aggregation website in which people discuss a
wide range of topics, particularly the community of cryptocurrencies is the biggest one among the
internet, with more than 600.000 subscribers. There are a wide variety of users (sophisticated and
unsophisticated), as a result, opinion formation on this community unveil different investment
strategies such as discovering a new altercoin or “smartly” recognize price patterns.4
Expectations formation on other’s investor’s opinions has been widely studied for years, for
instance Keynes (1936) wrote a clever metaphor to describe the heuristics’ individuals performed
3Keynes (1936) famous adage was that the stock market was mostly a beauty contest in which judges picked who
they thought other judges would pick, rather than who they considered to be most beautiful
4Another type of feedback formation occurs in specialized websites that impulse new users to follow “experienced”,
“professional” and “successful” investors, thus, disregarding private information, and following others’ actions is precisely
a clear contradiction with the EMH that states randomization irrational investors’ decisions.
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to invest in stock markets and newspapers competition for the most beautiful women among many
options during the thirties:
“. . . so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those which he
thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the
same point of view. It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one’s judgment, are really the
prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third
degree where we devote our intelligence to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to
be. And there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees.”
The scenario described by Keynes5 seemly relates to cryptocurrencies market, both on price
determination and which of them to choose invest. Discerning the degree of compliance within
the community is a challenging task since experienced users can take advantage of curious or
ignorant ones in diverse settings, an aspect that I will consider further. Nowadays we count on
more assertive evidence on Keynes’ anecdotal arguments thanks to empirical and experimental
evidence (Kahneman and Riepe 1998). Until now, I have described some of the belief formations on
feedback, which has been widely studied behavioral finance literature, thus, it seems that this field
is a good fit to describe Bitcoin market since efficiency is hardly possible for the existence of many
contradictions with the statements of the Efficient Market Hypothesis.
It is relevant to describe common biases in judgments and decision-making, also identified as
cognitive illusions that people usually reflect (Kahneman and Riepe 1998). It is also related to
the bounded rationality concept attributed to Simon (1982). He was concerned with the human
decision making “shortcuts” that could lead to suboptimal outcomes. Naturally, there is a vast
set of systematic behavioral biases that characterize individuals in financial-like markets such as
crypto-markets, however, they emerge from a setting in which heuristics are altered by market
participants and diverse signal and the noise. Moreover, it is been proved that in asset markets
the existence of irrational investors generates deviations from fundamentals, hence, under the
special case with cryptocurrencies the absence of a parameter of value creates a different puzzle.
At this point, it is relevant to classify the different cognitive biases found in the literature on which
people are affected. Hence, this study aim to create a properly standardized aggregation based
on literature reviews studies on behavioral finance from (Kahneman and Riepe 1998; Kumar and
Goyal 2015; Shiller 1999; Stracca 2004; Subrahmanyam 2008).
A crucial starting point in decision-making framework is to distinguish between beliefs and
preferences. Beliefs are salient in expectation formation, and usually, people develop non-optimal
judgments in what to believe due to a set of experimentally proved systematic errors called biases
Kahneman and Riepe (1998). My own view is that people involved in cryptocurrencies market
presumably suffer from several of the same judgment biases that have been documented in financial
markets settings, which can even get intensified by crypto-market idiosyncratic uncertainty and
complexity.
5Another concept attributed to Keynes is “animal spirits” which originally described business calculation, which he
considered the role of confidence, uncertainty and framing on investment heuristics is inexorable due to our human
nature, more precisely of “. . . a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of
quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities.”
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4.1 Overconfidence and optimism
Among the biases people display in financial market exist the exacerbated trust on our own ability,
knowledge, and skills, are entitled as overconfidence which is intrinsically related with optimism.
Moreover, this self-reliance on personal judgments entails concepts such as miscalibration, over-
precision, which are at the same time associated with an overreaction to random events (Barber
and Odean 2013; Barberis and Thaler 2002; Kahneman and Riepe 1998). A classic illustration of
overconfidence bias is the “better than the average” beliefs, which is the perception of a more than
proportional of a group’s composition that they perform better than the mean for the same group
for certain activities. For instance, Svenson (1981) found 90% of Swedish car drivers considered
themselves better than the average. Another example is the seemly narrow uncertainty in judg-
ments, in other words, people assign significantly less weight on chances of surprises than they
really occur. The typical example is when people were asked to evaluate 1 and 99 percentiles of an
index such as exchange rates a year from the reference point, the resulting 98% percent confidence
interval captured far less the expected value in comparison with expected intervals (Alpert and
Raiffa 1982). Hence, it has been proved that uncertainty is considerable high, in fact, the surprise
rate is about 20% where the accurate calibration would yield 2%. Also, Barber and Odean (2001)
found on the premise that men are more prone to overconfidence than women, that the former
gender trade more and display lower return than women. Other great contributions can be found in
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Daniel and Hirshleifer (2015), which also stated
how unlikely is the purely rational model to explain variability in stock prices due to systematic
departures from rational behavior.
4.2 Information and social wisdom
Confrontation of different ideas has been playing a essential role in the development of the society.
The invention of the printing press is one of the most significant, if not the most dramatic event that
yields to the conception of information as a near public good. There is evidence that the decline in
the cost of dissemination of knowledge and ideas due to press accounted for 18 and 68 percent of
European city growth between 1500 and 1600 (Dittmar 2011). Nowadays, in the digital economy,
information is no longer a scarce commodity, in fact, the opposite is exposed, there is an overload
of data that demands the creation of mechanisms to discern which is relevant and which is not.
On this matter, H. Simon accurately described the situation by saying “wealth of information creates
a poverty of attention”. Furthermore, as humans, we have limited computation capabilities and
increasing number of constrains to develop a single activity, hence, the formation of “rules of thumb”
usually takes place instead of coherent reasoning according to what each state demands. According
to Barber and Odean (2013), the extension to financial markets stems to the limited devotion to
investing mainly in two fashions: delayed reaction to salient information and overstated attention
to stale information that can lead to overreaction. As a result, an active agent in crypto marketplace
may face uncertainty and not be able to assess probabilities of events, accuracy, well-timed choices,
the degree of utility, and quality from some sort of heterogeneous information extracted from
sources such as social media, newspaper, forums, and so on.
Social judgment is intrinsic to cryptocurrency market since the valuation of any currency is contin-
gent to the extension of the group that founds it valuable. As with cryptocurrencies, most of the
information technologies exhibit network effects or network externalities, which is also particularly
strong in communication platforms. Under these scenarios, the strategy is to achieve the interest of
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a critical mass of users/investors that yield a higher market capitalization. Those early adopters
(“Whales” in cryptocurrencies’ slang) can be positioned and exert market power by manipulating
prices and making profits, this practice normally described as “Pump and Dump”. The objective
of boosting prices has as a mechanism the exposition of exaggerated announcement about the
future of any cryptocurrency, for instance, presumed cryptocurrency’s experts anchor prospects
by declaring future increases in prices, narrative stories of success, any Blockchain’s innovative
applications in social media, news, and forums. Once people receive this information, they have to
discern if it is accurate, but prices often react faster, then, it is strategically rational to follow not
only what others do, also movements of prices. The practice of imitating behavior has been studied
in extension in financial and non-financial markets settings, it has been named as positive feedback,
informational cascades or herding, with some commonalities and differences which I will try to
expose in the section about crypto-markets speculation.
4.3 The role of news, social media and discussion forums
The invention of newspapers permitted a rapid spreading of salient and not relevant information.
Moreover, it also provides as a ploy for the transmission of hypes with the purpose of capturing
reader’s attention towards different issues, being markets one of many of them.
One important aspect of cryptocurrencies is the fact that prices only rely purely on market par-
ticipants’ expectations on the future. Hence, heuristics regarding which cryptocurrency to trust
and second which trade strategy to follow given the information available. Regarding this point,
Figure 1 demonstrates the relevance of people interest and the correlation with Bitcoin price. Bitcoin
is an example of the limitations of the efficient market hypothesis.
“A mania involves increases in the prices of real estate or stocks or a currency or a commodity in the present
and near-future that are not consistent with the prices of the same real estate or stocks in the distant future”
(Kindleberger, Aliber, and Wiley 2005).
Reflecting a growing recognition of the role of fads and endogenous market fluctuations, much
research has focused in recent years on why large deviations of market values from fundamentals
occur in the first place and how “false” information or fads can be disseminated in the market.
Studying herd behavior6 has been the object of considerable effort in recent years for its possible
role in amplifying fads and lead market prices astray from fundamentals.
I suggest that these patterns can be explained by the difficulty of evaluating a large number of
available alternatives for investors to buy, by investors’ tendency to let their attention be directed by
outside sources such as the financial media, by the disposition effect, and by investors’ reluctance
to sell short (Barber and Odean 2001).
4.4 Positive feedback, Herding, and Informational Cascades
None of the theory on behavioral or “orthodox” finance has considered the scenario in which there
is no reference to be attached for. In my view, there are three levels of convictions regarding
positions about markets. The first is associated with the rational expectations assumption that
conveys investors react coherently to announcements that affect fundamentals. The second degree
6for a survey, Devenow and Welch (1996) and Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000)
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Figure 1: Google trends hits vs Bitcoin price
stems from the debatable conjecture that prices movements are truly ruled by fundamentals, in
which Shiller (2015) has been severely criticized by showing evidence of an excess of volatility.
Finally, we reach a third-degree exceptionally exposed by crypto-markets, in which by construction
there is no fundamental value, then prices will be determined in large extension by collective
valuation. Noting the crypto-markets nature, and the compelling evidence regarding human
behavior systematic biases exposed in financial-like markets, which represent the most evidence
supported economic theory, there is a final question to solve: in the absence of reference points to
prices, how do individuals take decisions in crypto-markets? In a broad context, comparing the
information or digital economy to the industrial, Shapiro and Varian (1999) stated that old economy
differentiates from the new in the substitution of economies of scale by the economics of networks.
That is, in a technological world, one finds utility as far other people’s preferences are aligned. For
instance, a messaging app has as the main purpose of communicating with a counterpart that can
be a group or individual. Nevertheless, if those whom I want to communicate with does not find
the same platform valuable, makes it worthless for me too. According to the same authors, in the
beginning, it is essential to reach a certain amount of users or critical mass, and the mechanism to
increment the number is driven by a positive feedback behavior.
It seems coherent to hypothesize that one detonating factor that has converted Bitcoin into the main
cryptocurrency independently for the fact that it is the first successful cryptocurrency implementa-
tion, is a combination of positive feedback mechanism and self-fulfilling prophecy. The sociologist
Merton (1948) defined a self-fulfilling prophecy as: “. . . a situation, evoking a new behavior which makes
the originally false conception come true.”, translating this situation to our case, it can be interpreted
as those initial opinions which featured digital currencies, particularly Bitcoin as a milestone of
a new era, even though few people then (probably now too) understand it. Indeed, little of the
main foresight have been fully realized, but reality seems blurry enough to keep the fad going on.
Merton adds: “For the prophet will cite actual course of events as proof that he was right from the very
beginning.” This is potentially related to market value foresight exposed in social media and forums
that declared exaggerated markups such as 10.000 or 20.000 dollars per BTC that eventually came
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true.
Anybody has been in a situation where our thoughts and actions are seemly aligned with what
others do. Typical transmission mechanisms are expressed as word-of-mouth communication, news
and social media exposition, in-place observation, or second degree manifestations such as market
prices (Grossman and Stiglitz 1976). One important feature herding or behavioral convergence is
that it entails a coordination mechanism, it can be a social learning heuristic by observing other
decision-makers or coordination based on some signal such as price movements(Devenow and
Welch 1996). Moreover, the among the range of situations where it has been reviewed we mentioned
investor trading, managerial investment, financing choices, analyst following and forecasts, market
prices, market regulation, bank runs, bubbles, and welfare (Brunnermeier and Oehmke 2013;
Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh 2003).
Several attempts have been made to describe crowd behavior in investing settings, particularly,
a seminal article from De Long et al. (1990) reintroduced the “noise” concept7. According to De
Long et al. (1990) perspective, noise trader represents the irrational alter ego of the sophisticated
investors, an investor which misperceive expected returns and generate beliefs and heuristics to
buy and sell following a simple feedback rule to form insights about market dynamics (Lux 1995).
Among the results exposed by De Long et al. (1990) I highlight that under the assumption of
unpredictability in opinions and beliefs bared by noise traders, they can earn higher returns than
sophisticated investors even though they distort prices, generating anomalies such as an excess of
volatility and mean reversion.
From the behavioral economics perspective, the literature on crowd behavior is called herding. It
is defined a decision-making approach characterized by mimicking actions of others, concretely,
Kumar and Goyal (2015) defines it as a “situation wherein rational people start behaving irrationally
by imitating the judgments of others while making decisions.”, it is also defined as any behavior simi-
larity/dissimilarity conveyed by the interaction of individuals (Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh 2003).
According to Graham (1999) the herding literature can be organized into four distinct categories:8
informational cascades, reputational herding, investigative herding and empirical herding, con-
versely. An informational cascade is described as a process that stems when someone (optimally)
choose to ignore her private information and instead jump to the bandwagon by mimicking the
actions of individuals who acted previously (Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch
1992; Graham 1999). In Bayesian reasoning context, it is the process of updating posteriors by
gradually shrinking prior’s weight as new and supposedly strong information is presented in a
sequential manner. Or in other words, cascades assumes that private signal (prior) likelihood ratios
are unbounded. As a result, it is likely that individuals in further chain of events will also fall into
mimicking due to the overwhelming nature of the mass beliefs, providing no useful information
for latter observers-actioners.
Among the most related and relevant theoretical contributions we have Banerjee (1992) who
found that decision rules chosen by optimizing individuals will be characterized by herd behavior.
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) provided proofs that informational cascades could
explain conformity, fads, fashions, booms and crashes. Along the same lines with informational
cascades, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) stated that in individual investment environments (and
reputational herding), managers usually disregard private information by adopting a follow-the-
7formerly attributed to Black (1986) who defined as the “opposite of information”
8Some other authors include payoff externalities (network externalities) models that show that the payoffs to an
agent adopting an action increases in the number of other agents adopting the same action Devenow and Welch (1996).
However, they have little relation with this study, further literature can be viewed in Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh (2003)
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crowd strategy which is an inefficient behavior from market perspective, albeit, this situation is
rational from their individual standpoint. Similarly, Welch (1992) results show in IPO settings where
shares are sold sequentially, latter investors based their buying decisions on previous actions, and
by extension forming cascades. Among the causes of herding we can mention limits of attention
exposed before can also increase the probability of herding or cascade due to the difficulty to
accurately process information (Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh 2003). It is import to highlight that
‘rational herding (maximizing the individual market participant’s utility) could involve the creation
of negative externalities (Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992).
On the empirical side Welch (2000) found that analysts herd in their stock recommendations
from data about buy and sell, exposing significant positive correlation between adjacent analysts.
Additionally, Welch showed that analyst’s elections are correlated with the prevailing forecast
and asymmetry towards a tendency to herd under the existence of optimism or positive news,
concluding that this situation can create fragility and further crashes. Those results are aligned with
a famous phrase in Keynes (1936) which says: “Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to
fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally”. Stracca (2004) explains that several factors may
reinforce a tendency to herding, including reputation in a principal-agent context if the performance
of the portfolio manager (the agent) is costly to monitor, and the fact that compensation is often
computed comparing with other investors performance, pushing risk-averse traders to conform to
the “average” assessment of the market[Cambiar esta redacción].
After describing some of the evidence, we can draw understandings about Bitcoin price formation,
given cryptocurrency markets idiosyncrasy formation of pure beliefs and fuzzy expectations.
Particularly, herding in crypto-markets could stem through price coordination mechanism that is it
can be (errors are implicit) the most efficient social learning model. This is described by empirical
herding category, which has been studying investors’ behavior when they do a momentum-
following or positive feedback investment that is, taking decision based on price patterns (Sornette
2003).
4.5 Strategies and price bubbles
The last two chapters were focused on describing common biases and heuristics to crypto-investors
respectively. We have determined that individuals in crypto-markets have several incentives to
chase the action, and rely their investments by observing prices and using them as a coordination
mechanism due to the lack of salient information or fundamental news. This scenario seemly
relates to the Internet Bubble (also known as dot-com, or Y2K) when companies like Amazon,
Ebay, and Yahoo! emerged. It was characterized by an over-expectation of future profits, as a
product of recent rises prices for internet related firms, investor were eager to invest in companies
that were associated with e-commerce, fiber optics, servers, chips, software, improved hardware,
telecommunications or any prefix that could sound as part of the “new economy” Kindleberger,
Aliber, and Wiley (2005). The bubble was characterized by a rapid increasing NASDAQ Composite
index, coming from 1300 in 1996 to 5400 only three years later9. According to Ofek and Richardson
(2001) rational explanations had little power to explain what happened, since internet stock prices
were significantly deviated from their underlying fundamentals and volatility of prices were
out/bounded expressing over-optimistic sentiment, lack of caution, and the panic of “not being part”
9It is relevant to highlight that during December 1996 Alan Greenspan (chairman of the Federal Reserve Board)
coined the famous concept of “Irrational Exuberance” to illustrate the effect of psychology in stock markets.
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among the investors. Particularly, on the last element, cryptocurrency slang has a special acronym
to express this behavior, it is known as #FOMO or “Fear of Missing Out”, that is, the anxiety of not
get into the market when an unexpected event unchain a rapid valorization of a certain digital
coin. Another example about investors’ irrationality was Black Monday, the crash that took place
in October 29 of 1987, on this matter Shiller (1987) expressed that nothing seemed to be different
during those days among the investors whom he surveyed, perhaps, a perception that the market
was overpriced, he also emphasized in the existence of large price movements without any news
breaks, which is not consistent with the EMH which had been criticized for other authors (De Bondt
and Thaler 1985). Shiller insisted in stating that crashes10 seems to be determined endogenously
by investors, either by reaction to others’ actions or manifestations expressed in prices (from here
devised the concept of positive feedback trading). Moreover, some investors conveyed they rely on
“gut feeling” as their forecasting method (in contraposition to fundamental or technical analysis).
One of the main aspects to consider in such scenarios is the impact of speculative price movements,
particularly Kindleberger, Aliber, and Wiley (2005) stated that:
“The insiders destabilize by driving the price up and up and then sell at or near the top to the outsiders. The
losses of the outsiders necessarily are equal to the gains of the insiders. [. . . ] But the professional insiders
initially destabilize by exaggerating the upswings and the downswings; these insiders follow the mantra that
the ‘trend is my friend.’ At one stage, these investors were known as ‘tape watchers;’ more recently they
have been called ‘momentum investors.’ The outsider amateurs who buy high and sell low are the victims of
euphoria that affects them late in the day. After they lose, they go back to their normal occupations to save for
another splurge five or ten years in the future.”
On one side there are those who think markets are rational and efficient, are explaining deviations
as an exceptional movement from fundamental value. The other side is composed by those who
believe psychological behavior as the main driver. The way investor believes they act as they are
more intelligent as the average investor in the market, hence having a big chance to take out the
money safe and the sound is described by Read (2012) who mentioned:
“Since the crash is not a certain deterministic outcome of the bubble, it remains rational for investors to remain
in the market provided they are compensated by a higher rate of growth of the bubble for taking the risk of a
crash, because there is a finite probability of ‘landing smoothly’, that is, of attaining the end of the bubble
without crash.”
In this work, it has been hypothesized that when prices in cryptocurrency goes up or down can be
attributed in great to herding or positive feedback reaction to past price changes. The parallelism to
the insiders can be attributed to the whales in crypto-markets seemly behave as insiders or private
informed investors which as Kindleberger, Aliber, and Wiley (2005) states, manipulate price’s
movements as to destabilize the market by artificially creating exaggerated successive upswings
and prices decrease to make the less informed to buy high and sell low, making them only victims
of the euphoria (Shiller 1999, 2015; Shleifer 2004).
10Consistent with the argument that noisy participants can affect markets in a non-transitory fashion.
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5 Methodology
To date few methods have been developed to test for empirical herding under prices settings. In
the literature review section it has been mentioned that direct observation on investors’ actions
is the best approach to test for herding, since the coordination mechanism and the potential
tilting towards the social convention is transparent from the flow of information dynamics within
individuals. Nonetheless, in cryptocurrency market this is almost impossible due to its privacy,
hence this study will follow prices as coordination mechanism.
This limitation is not unique, in several financial settings analyzing stocks or exchanges rates almost
impossible to get information of market participants. Given that herding cannot be measured
directly from financial markets, the literature has developed different proxies for detecting herding
behavior based on return’s regression tests. This study employs the methodology present in
(Chang, Cheng, and Khorana 2000), which is an improvement from original methodology offered
by Christie and Huang (1995). Christie and Huang (1995) suggested the use of Cross-Sectional
Standard Deviation of returns (CSSD) to identify herding behavior in financial markets, it is defined
as:
CSSDt =
√
∑ni=1 (Ri,t − R¯m,t)2
N − 1 (1)
where Ri is the observed stock return on a firm i (in our study it is described as c as presented in the
data section) at time t, while CSSDT is the cross sectional average of the returns in the aggregated
portfolio at time t. The implicit indication of the CSSD is that it quantifies the average proximity of
individuals’ returns to the mean, by extension, CSSD will always be equal or above zero, where
a value tied to the lowest bound expresses a situation when all returns flow in harmony while a
deviation from the zero mark represents dispersion. According to Christie and Huang (1995) it
is possible to test for herding under market stress (large upswings and downswings) events by
exploiting investors’ tendency to overturn their private beliefs in favor of the market consensus.
This conclusion stems from a rational the Capital Asset Pricing Model11 (CAPM) which predicts
that the dispersion will increase with the absolute value of the market return since individual
assets differ in their sensitivity to the market return. On the other side, if herding exists, individual
returns will not differ greatly from the market results. Christie and Huang (1995) empirical tests is
estimated as the Equation 2:
CSSDt = α+ βLDLt + β
U DUt + εt (2)
where:
DLt = 1 if market return on day lies in the extreme lower tail of the distribution, or zero otherwise
DUt = 1 if market return on day lies in the extreme upper tail of the distribution, or zero otherwise
This model was developed to capture differences in investor behavior upon extreme upswings
or downswings in comparison to what it is expected to be “normal”, expressed as the 90% or 98%
percent of the distribution. Nonetheless, this methodology have two main drawbacks, firstly, it
11The CAPM relates risk of an investment and the expected returns given a market benchmark, which in stock market
settings is for many cases the S&P500, deriving a measure of sensibility and asset is in comparison to the movements of
the market. In this study Iit has been established it as a base line to denote rationality in cryptocurrency markets.
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is too sensitive to outliers and secondly, it is completely arbitrary what is considered as “extreme”
since the 1% and 5% rule might not fit good for all distributions. Consequently this study will
followed an version to Christie and Huang’s model proposed by Chang, Cheng, and Khorana
(2000)12 which is based on the Cross-Sectional Absolute Deviations defined as:
CSADt =
1
N
|Ri,t − R¯m,t| (3)
The CSAD is a measure of dispersion that takes the absolute difference between the individuals
return and the average market returns, which makes it far less sensitive to return’s outliers than
quadratic one. Figure 2 illustrates the CSAD measure for the full sample, in which it is noticeable a
structural break in the first quarter of 2017 characterized by a level disruption and a higher degree
of dispersion. Chang, Cheng, and Khorana (2000) demonstrated “that rational asset pricing models
predict not only that equity return dispersions are an increasing function of the market return but also
that the relation is linear”. Moreover, they rely on the following intuition: “if market participants
tend to follow aggregate market behavior and ignore their own priors during periods of large average price
movements, then the linear and increasing relation between dispersion and market return will no longer
hold. Instead, the relation can become non-linearly increasing or even decreasing. . . ” This model has been
recently employed by several papers, for instance, Arjoon and Shekhar (2017) examined herding in
the context of frontier market, Chiang and Zheng (2010) found herding behavior in advanced stock
markets, Demirer, Lee, and Lien (2015) empirically tested for herding commodity financialization
settings and Balcilar, Balcilar, Demirer, and Hammoudeh (2013) who studied for herding in Gulf
Arab stock markets. Following the line of the aforementioned papers, this study starting with a
reference model specified as:
CSADt = γ0 + γ1|Rm,t|+ γ2R2m,t + εt (4)
The model exposed in Equation 4 aims to detect significant dispersion of returns during markets
stress. Hence, a statistically significant negative coefficient of i.e. indicates that herding is likely to
be occurring, whereas a significant positive implies a presence of adverse herding. On identification
of herding Kabir and Shakur (2018) highlights what Wohar and Gebka (2013) stated about a possible
situation when investors “overemphasize their own view or focus on views dominant among subset of
actors (who may herd jointly moving in and out of positions) excessively ignoring market information, it
results in increased dispersion in returns across assets leading to adverse herding”. It is important to
clarify that as many other author that had been studying herding behavior (Arjoon and Shekhar
2017; Chiang and Zheng 2010; Economou, Katsikas, and Vickers 2016) this model employs Newey
and West (1987) clever solution to account for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
standard errors in regression coefficients, besides the inclusion of lagged dependent variables ( to
guarantee that effects are not a consequence of autocorrelation dynamics.
Since herding varies across time flows, it would be interesting to determine whether there are
specific periods when herding behavior is manifested and when it is not, hence, this study will
include a regime Markov Switching (MS) approach to identify regimes in which herding is exhibited.
A MS regression is a useful method to express adjustments which are more pronounced in high
frequency data, moreover, it offers advantages to reveal patterns commonly hidden in data such as
12Chang, Cheng, and Khorana (2000) stated that Christie and Huang (1995) approach “requires a far greater magnitude of
non-linearity in the return dispersion and mean return relationship for evidence of herding than suggested by rational asset pricing
models”.
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non-linearity. Regarding the amount of regimes, the definition is not a straightforward task, on
this matter, Psaradakis and Spagnolo (2003) states that dynamic models with parameters that are
allowed to depend on the state of a hidden Markov chain have become a popular tool for modelling
time series subject to changes in regimes, nonetheless, the determination of an adequate number of
states to characterize the observed data it is not conclusive. The MS models offer an advantage over
the linear models due to their ability to reveal patterns beyond traditional stylized facts, which
only nonlinear models can generate. In Psaradakis and Spagnolo (2003) view, a rule of thumb for
autoregressive models based on AIC values do provide a good instrument to choose the correct
state dimension.
5.1 Data
According to the site coinmarketcap.com up to April 2018 there were 1564 different cryptocurrencies
available in the market, nonetheless, this study dampens the sample to the first 100 leading ones
which in aggregated terms account for nearly 96% of total cryptocurrency’s market capitalization.
Getting information about all cryptocurrencies prices, market capitalization and descriptions is not
a completely easy task. The easy way would be to buy information on specialized websites that sell
datasets, however, it has been scraped the website www.coinmarketcap.com. The original data
includes open, close, highest and lowest prices, besides its current market capitalization given a
day for each CC. Since crypto-markets are relative new, it is easy to deduce that non all 100 original
presented CC have the same starting dates, particularly, the two with more observations (1801) are
Bitcoin and Litecoin which extends from April 29, 2013 and ends as all the rest in April 3, 2018.
Measuring herding intensity by analyzing prices demands to work with returns, thus I determined
the daily return of each c cryptocurrency arithmetic as follows (Equation 5):
Rc,t =
Pc,t − Pc,t−1
Pc,t−1
(5)
Where R denotes the price returns of cryptocurrency c on day t, and CP is the closing price of
cryptocurrency. Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics of returns for the first 50 cryptocurrencies.
One of the most iconic features of cryptocurrencies is the existence of large deviations from the
mean, this volatility is exposed by the existence of long tail distribution for most of the sample
CC this study considered. For instance, taking in count the subsample seen in table 1, the “grand”
average return is 1.3%, while the average median is -0.1%, as a result is not surprise to find a third
moment average of 3.7.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of returns for the top 50 cryptocurrencies
Cryptocurrency Obs. Mean S.D. Min Q25 Median Q75 Max Skewness Kurtosis
Jarque
Bera
0x 230 0.010 0.112 -0.290 -0.054 -0.006 -0.054 0.632 1.328 7.9 296.0
Aeternity 306 0.017 0.168 -0.701 -0.056 0.007 -0.056 0.875 0.751 9.6 577.7
Aion 167 0.023 0.186 -0.610 -0.067 -0.002 -0.067 1.046 1.739 11.0 529.3
Ardor 551 0.008 0.099 -0.408 -0.049 0.002 -0.049 0.666 0.989 8.4 752.3
Augur 789 0.009 0.105 -0.532 -0.040 0.000 -0.040 1.014 2.261 23.1 14006.4
Binance Coin 252 0.028 0.142 -0.335 -0.047 0.006 -0.047 0.964 2.008 12.2 1062.6
Bitcoin 1801 0.003 0.045 -0.234 -0.012 0.002 -0.012 0.430 0.512 12.9 7465.8
Bitcoin Cash 254 0.009 0.119 -0.360 -0.051 -0.008 -0.051 0.540 1.396 7.8 322.5
Bitcoin
Diamond
130 0.010 0.356 -0.692 -0.109 -0.014 -0.109 3.215 5.917 52.4 13992.4
Bitcoin Gold 162 -0.001 0.166 -0.714 -0.070 -0.013 -0.070 1.002 1.874 15.5 1151.3
BitShares 1352 0.005 0.086 -0.324 -0.035 -0.003 -0.035 0.682 2.063 14.7 8693.1
Bytecoin 1386 0.010 0.159 -0.467 -0.053 0.000 -0.053 3.942 12.114 277.1 4373159.0
Bytom 238 0.014 0.131 -0.428 -0.050 -0.004 -0.050 0.825 1.757 11.8 889.8
Cardano 184 0.021 0.169 -0.251 -0.063 -0.002 -0.063 1.367 4.186 29.3 5822.8
Dash 1509 0.009 0.107 -0.374 -0.028 -0.002 -0.028 2.563 10.377 225.1 3129151.5
Decred 783 0.009 0.096 -0.290 -0.044 -0.001 -0.044 0.555 1.614 8.3 1272.0
DigixDAO 715 0.007 0.093 -0.726 -0.038 -0.001 -0.038 0.785 0.787 17.0 5950.3
Dogecoin 1570 0.005 0.100 -0.440 -0.025 -0.004 -0.025 2.210 8.032 159.6 1621924.5
EOS 276 0.015 0.149 -0.320 -0.051 -0.007 -0.051 1.683 5.469 59.0 37409.3
Ethereum 970 0.009 0.079 -0.728 -0.027 -0.001 -0.027 0.510 0.234 15.6 6396.5
Ethereum
Classic
618 0.011 0.155 -0.373 -0.032 -0.004 -0.032 3.233 14.674 303.9 2352930.3
ICON 158 0.020 0.149 -0.321 -0.067 0.003 -0.067 0.592 1.032 5.5 69.3
IOTA 294 0.008 0.108 -0.314 -0.057 -0.001 -0.057 0.468 0.820 6.1 149.4
Komodo 422 0.025 0.300 -0.749 -0.052 0.000 -0.052 5.601 15.366 286.4 1429157.4
Lisk 727 0.013 0.158 -0.810 -0.042 -0.004 -0.042 1.517 3.410 33.5 29522.3
Litecoin 1801 0.005 0.077 -0.402 -0.019 0.000 -0.019 1.291 4.845 67.0 314227.5
Maker 151 0.081 0.892 -0.248 -0.040 -0.007 -0.040 10.896 11.928 145.1 130694.2
Monero 1412 0.007 0.082 -0.315 -0.033 -0.001 -0.033 0.794 1.628 14.1 7845.7
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Cryptocurrency Obs. Mean S.D. Min Q25 Median Q75 Max Skewness Kurtosis
Jarque
Bera
Nano 377 0.029 0.161 -0.306 -0.069 0.009 -0.069 1.024 1.771 9.6 881.3
NEM 1098 0.011 0.109 -0.303 -0.038 0.000 -0.038 1.706 4.807 62.7 167350.2
NEO 571 0.015 0.131 -0.407 -0.044 -0.004 -0.044 1.228 2.897 23.8 11048.5
OmiseGO 263 0.018 0.125 -0.256 -0.049 0.001 -0.049 0.741 1.876 11.3 909.3
Ontology 26 0.002 0.134 -0.423 -0.079 0.030 -0.079 0.259 -1.075 5.3 10.6
Populous 265 0.014 0.130 -0.691 -0.060 0.007 -0.060 0.833 1.182 13.5 1278.5
Qtum 314 0.010 0.129 -0.364 -0.054 -0.004 -0.054 0.751 1.970 11.8 1216.8
RChain 179 0.020 0.162 -0.376 -0.060 0.000 -0.060 0.876 2.270 12.0 758.1
Ripple 1703 0.006 0.092 -0.460 -0.023 -0.003 -0.023 1.794 6.120 97.9 649986.5
Siacoin 950 0.013 0.124 -0.385 -0.046 0.000 -0.046 0.814 1.932 11.1 3178.3
Status 279 0.011 0.147 -0.250 -0.058 -0.006 -0.058 1.161 3.705 26.9 7268.1
Steem 715 0.010 0.145 -0.345 -0.061 -0.011 -0.061 1.857 4.312 44.5 53628.9
Stellar 1337 0.007 0.096 -0.307 -0.032 -0.003 -0.032 1.061 3.867 35.2 61194.9
Stratis 599 0.016 0.110 -0.290 -0.051 0.005 -0.051 0.663 1.401 8.3 895.2
Tether 1128 0.000 0.025 -0.499 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.650 8.397 535.5 13338912.4
TRON 202 0.030 0.204 -0.318 -0.061 -0.004 -0.061 1.196 2.751 14.7 1399.9
VeChain 224 0.021 0.147 -0.496 -0.063 0.000 -0.063 0.706 0.861 6.1 115.0
Verge 1256 0.029 0.262 -0.600 -0.071 0.000 -0.071 5.800 9.460 193.8 1924531.2
Wanchain 11 -0.013 0.081 -0.135 -0.071 -0.006 -0.071 0.112 0.052 2.0 0.4
Waves 670 0.006 0.087 -0.520 -0.036 0.001 -0.036 0.382 -0.073 7.7 613.7
Zcash 521 0.002 0.124 -0.719 -0.043 -0.005 -0.043 1.826 6.131 95.2 187758.5
Zilliqa 68 -0.012 0.088 -0.207 -0.081 -0.001 -0.081 0.184 -0.027 2.6 0.6
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Figure 2: Actual and squared cryptocurrency’ market median returns and CSAD
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6 Empirical results
6.1 Estimates of herding behavior
In this section, it has been presented the estimates for the models in the methodology. The first
model is the standard (linear) herding model which is common in the literature, and we will
herein refer to it as the static model because it has constant parameters. The second model is the
Markov-switching (nonlinear) model which accommodates herding over multiple regimes. A
Markovian switching herding model can be illustrated as Equation 5:
CSADt,1 = γ1,0 + γ1,1|Rm,1|+ γ1,2R2m,t + γ1,kCSADt−k + εt,s εt,s = N(0, σ21 ) St = 1
CSADt,2 = γ2,0 + γ2,1|Rm,2|+ γ2,2R2m,t + γ2,kCSADt−k + εt,s εt,s = N(0, σ22 ) St = 2
...
...
...
CSADt,s = γs,0 + γs,1|Rm,s|+ γs,2R2m,t + γs,kCSADt−k + εt,s εt,s = N(0, σ2s ) St = s
(6)
Where p is defined as the transition probability of the Markovian chain that can be illustrated as ,
hence, is the probability of being in regime S at time t given that the in St the regime is equal to j.
Therefore, know the model will be able to identify when exhibits herding or not, besides different
magnitudes this behavior.
Table 2: Regression estimates of herding behavior on the full sample
Coef. Static
Regimes
1 2 3
Intercept 0.005* 1.883 0.025*** 3.138 0.025*** 3.138 0.025*** 3.138
‖Rm,t‖ 0.240*** 3.17 1.955*** 4.5 -0.385*** -5.066 0.581*** 5.189
R2m,t -0.27 -1.079 -9.979** -2.479 1.645*** 8.989 -0.902*** -3.685
CSADt−1 0.430*** 18.998 0.371*** 6.29 0.336*** 8.403 0.401*** 9.423
CSADt−2 0.220*** 9.098 0.193** 2.573 0.136** 2.016 0.184*** 3.652
CSADt−3 0.277*** 12.227 0.280*** 3.855 0.177*** 6.669 0.227*** 8.678
R2 0.79 0.50 0.76 0.79
AIC -4128.8 -6004.4
This table presents the estimated coefficients of equation 4: CSADt = γ0 + γs,1|Ri,t| +
γs,2R2m,t + γs,kCSADt−k + εt for the existence of herding. In this specification the intercept is
static, that is, it does not change across regimes, while other variables not. The numbers in
second row are t-statistics, whereas ***, ** and * stands for significance at 1
Table 2 reports the estimates for static model and a three regime switching models according to the
specification seen in equation 3. The coefficients are were estimated using Newey and West (1987)
methodology, to achieve heteroscedastic and autocorrelation consistent standard error estimates
for the full sample, that is, the main 100 cryptocurrencies according their market capitalization. As
I have explained before, under the assumption that dispersion and the absolute market returns are
linearly related, we must center the attention on the coefficient associated with , since it captures
herding behavior under market stress. In column 3 we can see that in the static model has a negative
sign, nevertheless it is non-significant. The possible explanation is a high degree of variability that
cancels the effect across the sample, for this matter it is useful to rely on the Markov Switching
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estimates that account dynamics in the parameters. Following the estimates of MS model for the
first regime in column 3 it has been found a significant negative coefficient of suggesting herding
behavior in cryptocurrencies market the full sample (or “portfolio”). Moving to the third regime,
there is statistical evidence in favor of herding, nonetheless the magnitude is far lower than the
first regime exposed above. Interestingly, there is also a second state where reverse herding is
prominent in the market, seeing at column 3 a coefficient of , an evidence of market participants
behavior characterized by performing contrary to market consensus, leading to a higher degree of
cross sectional return’s dispersion in the cryptocurrency market.
The most striking result that stems from the MS model is the identification of periods where herding
behavior has been found significant. From Figure 3 it can be seen that by far the greatest amount
of time cryptocurrency market exhibits dynamics opposite to what a rational asset pricing would
expect. A further examination of the graph permits to identify a high probability of regimes 1 and
2 to fit the data, those two states as explained above had been found to a strong evidence in favor
of herding, prominently on the first regime (light blue). In addition, the coefficients associated with
the absolute cross sectional returns are significant and positive across all models (static and MS)
suggesting an increasing linear relationship to dispersion values of CSAD.
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Figure 3: Regime switching smoothed probabilities under symmetric herding behavior for the full
sample
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6.2 Estimates of herding behavior under asymmetric market states
This investigation began to test the presence of herd behavior in a sample of the first main cryp-
tocurrencies filtered according their market capitalization. In the past section, it has been found
that dispersion decreases when extreme returns are present in the market, nonetheless, it remains
to distinguish between the directions in which returns goes. Regarding this matter, many of the
recent empirical studies coincide in the important to distinguish between herding behavior under
irregular market dynamics, in other words, account for asymmetric reaction in face of downswings
and upswings in the market returns (Arjoon and Shekhar 2017; Chiang and Zheng 2010; Demirer
and Kutan 2006; Economou, Katsikas, and Vickers 2016). In order to test whether crypto-investors
react differently on days when the median returns are positive or negative, it has been created a
dummy variable coded as Equation 7:
H(up, down) =
{
(1− D)R2m i f Rm,t ≥ 0
DR2m i f Rm,t < 0
(7)
Which leads to a new specification given by Equation 8:
CSADt,1 = γ0,1 + γ1,1D× |Rm,1|+ γ2,1(1− D)× |Rm,1|+
D× γ3,1R2m,1 + γ4,1(1− D)× R2m,1 + γ4+k,1CSADt−k,1 + εt,1 St = 1
CSADt,2 = γ0,2 + γ1,2D× |Rm,2|+ γ2,2(1− D)× |Rm,2|+
D× γ3,2R2m,2 + γ4,2(1− D)× R2m,2 + γ4+k,2CSADt−k,2 + εt,2 St = 2
...
...
CSADt,s = γ0,s + γ1,sD× |Rm,s|+ γ2,s(1− D)× |Rm,s|+
D× γ3,sR2m,s + γ4,s(1− D)× R2m,s + γ4+k,sCSADt−k,s + εt,s St = s
(8)
Table 3 reports the regression estimates for herding under asymmetric conditions for the static
and regime switching models as described in equation 8. In contrast with the model described
in equation 5, this time it has been found that a four regimes fits better the phenomenon. The
static regression estimate of the coefficient (column 5) confirms the existence of herding when
market exhibits positive returns since parameters leads to enough statistical evidence in favor
of this behavior. On the other side, contrary to our expectations, there is statistical evidence in
favor of reverse herding under the existence of declining returns , this leads to the conclusion that
crypto-investors do not follow the consensus when market returns decrease. The fact that when
cryptocurrency markets faces extreme negative returns individuals do not “flight to safety”, on the
contrary, it implies that the “HODL” strategy is consistent with the data.
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Table 3: Regression estimates of herding behavior on the full sample under asymmetric states
Coef. Static
Regimes
1 2 3 4
Intercept 0.007* 1.806 0.026*** 10.958 0.026*** 10.958 0.026*** 10.958 0.026*** 10.958
D× ‖Rm,t‖ -0.916*** -4.819 -0.778*** -2.885 -0.017 -0.037 0.480*** 6.747 -6.508*** -3.95
(1− D)× ‖Rm,t‖ 0.734*** 7.384 1.251*** 9.754 0.118 1.155 -0.491*** -24.813 4.314*** 3.662
D× ‖R2m,t‖ 1.56 1.609 1.164 0.858 -0.836 -0.416 -1.358*** -3.487 25.960** 2.243
(1− D)× ‖R2m,t‖ -1.169*** -4.266 -2.188*** -7.63 0.376 1.303 1.372*** 25.652 -18.809* -1.895
CSADt−1 0.427*** 19.363 0.374*** 7.101 0.252*** 7.616 0.269*** 12.634 0.372*** 5.274
CSADt−2 0.221*** 9.36 0.259*** 5.264 0.139*** 5.326 0.200*** 6.636 0.201*** 2.619
CSADt−3 0.277*** 12.534 0.241*** 5.569 0.289*** 14.297 0.118*** 3.99 0.220*** 2.926
R2 0.80 0.85 0.83 0.91 0.57
AIC -4219.5 -6231.4
This table presents the estimated coefficients of equation 4: CSADt = γs,0 + γs,1D|Rm,t| + γs,2(1− D)|Rm,t| + γs,3DR2m,t +
γs,4(1− D)R2m,t + ∑ki=1 γs,k+4CSADt−k + εt for the existence of herding. In this specification the intercept is static, that is, it
does not change across regimes, while other variables not. The numbers in second row are t-statistics, whereas ***, ** and *
stands for significance at 1
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Figure 4: Regime switching smoothed probabilities under asymmetric herding behavior for the full
sample
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Additionally, it has been estimated the parameters of the MS herding model under based on
equation 8 in order to observe if the static model fails to capture potential unobserved dynamic
structures of herding behavior over time. The column 4 in table 3 presents the estimates for herding
under extreme declining market settings.
Even though herding behavior under increasing returns situations was significant at a 1% level
in the static model with , the extension of the model of MS unveiled the true dynamics inside the
data generating process. Particularly, there is an important difference between the aforementioned
evidence of herding and the one visible in regime 3. Under a strengthen market situation, is has
been found a very strong coefficient significant at a 10% threshold level that supports herding.
Looking at Figure 4, it is clear that during the second semester of 2017 and the first days of 2018,
the cryptocurrency market exhibited increasing level of cross sectional absolute deviations (or
dispersion), with a substantial reversion from 2018 until the end of the sample. During that time,
the model found that consensus was evident across investors as the prices started to rise.
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7 Conclusion
This essay was undertaken to evaluate the pertinence of behavioral finance as a framework to
explain price dynamics in crypto-markets taking as a central point a series of potential biases in
decision making from the investors. Aiming to this objective, it has been reviewed literature on
cognitive biases that has brought evidence of existence of anomalies, or deviations from what
a rational could be expected in financial related environments. Among the diverse possible
explanations of price movements from a behavioral perspective, the theory of herding which
consists in a situation when individuals ignore their private information and instead follow the
consensus is under prior consideration a good approach to start the discussion.
The apparent relevance of herding hypothesis to explain price movements demanded the task
of finding an empirical model that led me to study the phenomena when only prices were the
coordination mechanism. The former, and most relevant methodology to test for herding when
only prices are available is attributed to Christie and Huang (1995), then is had been improved for
Chang, Cheng, and Khorana (2000) among other authors, this study follow the same line.
The evidence from this study suggests that investors frequently deviated from the rational asset
pricing benchmark, and instead follow the consensus in market stress situations. This findings
have important implications, first, as I am concerned, this is the first study which analyzed the
price puzzle from herding hypothesis, second, it unveils a signal that contradicts the circulated
“noise” exposed in internet which asserts for the existence of informed people who are not sensitive
to large price movements in cryptomarkets.
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